One of the standard predictions of the agency theory is that more incentives can be given to agents with lower risk aversion. In this paper we show that this relationship may be absent or reversed when the technology is endogenous and projects with a higher e¢ ciency are also riskier. Using a modi…ed version of the Holmstrom and Milgrom's [1] framework, we obtain that lower agent's risk aversion unambiguously leads to higher incentives when the technology function linking e¢ ciency and riskiness is elastic, while the risk aversionincentive relationship can be positive when this function is rigid.
Introduction
One of the main results of the agency theory is the trade-o¤ between incentives and insurance.
Lower agent's risk aversion allows the principal to provide more incentives by making the payment of the agent more related to output while higher uncertainty increases the gains from insuring the agent and reduces the pay-for-performance sensitivity. The empirical works testing the link between uncertainty and incentives have found mixing results however (e.g., Rao and Hanumantha [2] , Allen and Lueck [3] , Aggarwal and Samwick [4] , Core and Guay [5] , Wulf [6] ).
In many cases, the empirical …ndings are even in contradiction with the standard predictions of the theory as they document a positive (rather than negative) correlation between observed measures of uncertainty and the provision of incentives (see Prendergast [7] for an extensive discussion on this point).
Some recent contributions on the matching literature (e.g., Wright [8] , Legros and Newman [9] , Serfes [10, 11] , Li and Ueda [12] ) has attempted to o¤er a theoretical justi…cation of the above cited results. The explanation provided has been based on the endogenous matching between principals and agents by introducing the heterogeneity on managers' degree of risk aversion (Wright [8] ), on the assortative matching between risk-averse agents and riskier principals (Serfes [10] ), or on the matching between agents and …rms that di¤er respectively for the level of productivity and riskiness (Li and Ueda [12] ).
Di¤erently from the logic developed in the matching models, in this paper we propose an alternative and simpler explanation of the relationship between risk and incentives based on the endogeneity of the technology adopted by the principal. In particular, we show that the traditional relationship between agent's risk aversion and optimal incentive may be absent or reversed when the technology is endogenous and projects with higher e¢ ciency are also riskier.
In order to describe the mechanisms at work in our theory, we propose a modi…ed version of the Holmstrom and Milgrom's [1] framework where the principal can choose among a continuous set of projects where those with higher e¢ ciency are also characterized by higher riskiness. While the employment of the Holmstrom and Milgrom's framework implies some simplifying assumptions (such as constant absolute risk aversion utility function, quadratic costs and normally distributed shocks), it allows us to describe the mechanisms at work in a clear and simple model that generates closed-form solutions.
We obtain that lower agent's risk aversion unambiguously leads to higher incentives only when the technology function linking risk and e¢ ciency is elastic, while the risk aversionincentive relationship can be positive when this function is rigid. This is because a lower risk aversion of the agent makes it optimal for the principal the adoption of a riskier and a more e¢ cient technology. While the higher e¢ ciency of the new technology (as well as the lower agent's risk aversion) allows the principal to give more incentives to the agent, its higher riskiness makes the provision of incentives more costly which works in the direction of reducing the optimal degree of the pay-for-performance sensitivity.
In other words, whereas less risk averse agents would normally induce the principal to provide more incentives, they also lead her to choose more productive and riskier technologies.
The higher e¢ ciency of the new technology also pushes towards an increase of incentives but the higher riskiness works in the opposite direction making it optimal their reduction. The relative strength of this latter e¤ect is related to the elasticity of technology function linking e¢ ciency and riskiness, and it is higher the lower such elasticity. When this situation occurs, the relationship between the agent's degree of risk aversion and incentives becomes positive.
As we anticipated above, our work is related to the matching literature that addresses the issue of the link between uncertainty and incentives. In particular, by introducing competition for heterogeneous managers, who di¤er in their degrees of risk aversion, Wright [8] proves that a negative or positive relationship between agents'risk and incentives is possible and depends on the relative risk aversion of the managers and the riskiness of the environments. Serfes [10] shows that, whereas under e¢ cient positive assortative matching (in which higher risk-averse agents are optimally matched with riskier principals) the traditional trade-o¤ between risk and incentives holds, under e¢ cient negative assortative matching (lower risk-averse agents are matched with riskier principals) this trade-o¤ can fail to hold, in particular when matching curves are very steep. Li and Ueda [12] show, instead, that if the agents di¤er only in their productivity, safer …rms will o¤er high-powered incentives schemes, in this way capturing the higher productive workers at the endogenous matching. Legros and Newman [9] look in general at the su¢ cient conditions for monotone matching when the utility between partners is not fully transferable. In an application to principal-agent model, they show that when the agents'risk aversion does not decline too quickly, the agents with lower risk aversion (or higher wealth) are matched to principals with safer projects. 1 It is worth noting that, di¤erently from matching models, where both principals and agents can select endogenously their partners, in our model 1 This could also explain the counterintuitive tendency of wealthier peasants to tend safer crops than poor peasants in medieval sharecropping (Ackerberg and Botticini [13] ). A few other authors have contributed to this important relationship in principal-agent models. Among them, Mookherjee and Ray [14] who model an in…nitely repeated interaction among principals and agents randomly matched at each period, Barros and Macho-Stadler [15] who look into a situation where several principals compete for an agent and Dam and Castrillo [16] who propose a model to analyze an economy with several principals and agents in order to characterize the set of stable outcomes. the principal only decides the technology to adopt (with its peculiar riskiness) and the bonus paid to the agent to incentivize his e¤ort. Here neither the principal nor the agent are allowed to select their preferred partner.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the framework and Section 3 provides the solution of the model. Section 4 presents the comparative statics analysis of the e¤ect of a reduction of the agent's risk aversion on incentives. Section 5 provides a discussion on our framework and on a modi…ed version of it. Section 6 concludes.
The Framework
We consider a moral hazard model as in Holmstrom and Milgrom [1] . The principal decides the technology and is risk neutral. The agent is risk averse and has a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility function u with a coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion equal to r, i.e. u = exp f rxg ;
(
where x is the agent's payo¤. Total output is equal to
where e is the agent's action (e.g., e¤ort) and " is an (unobservable) random variable normally distributed with zero mean and variance 2 . The technology is characterized by quadratic costs, so that the agent's cost of action is
where k is a constant representing the e¢ ciency of the technology employed. Better technologies are characterized by a lower cost parameter k and vice-versa. The agent's reservation utility is equal to .
We here modify the Holmstrom and Milgrom's framework by assuming the existence of a given set of technologies (or projects) with di¤erent levels of e¢ ciency and riskiness among which the principal can choose. In particular, we assume a trade-o¤ between e¢ ciency and riskiness so that technologies with a higher volatility 2 also have a lower marginal cost of e¤ort, i.e.,
where k > 0 for all 2 2 (0; 2 ). 2 For simplicity, the function k( ) is assumed to be a continuous and di¤erentiable in 2 . As we shall see, the following conditions on the technology function ensure that an interior solution for the optimal technology always exists: (i) k 00 large enough,
The timing of events in our framework is the following: (1) the principal decides the optimal technology and the agent's payment scheme; (2) the agent optimally chooses the action.
In the next sections, we determine the choices of the principal and of the agent, and analyze the e¤ects of a variation of the agents' risk aversion on the optimal payment scheme of the agent.
The Equilibrium
We solve the problem by determining the optimal payment scheme and the agent's action for a given technology. 3 Then, we determine the optimal technology choice of the principal.
Holmstrom and Milgrom [1] show that a linear payment is optimal in the above framework, so that the agent's payment can be written as s (y) = y + , where and are constants optimally chosen by the principal that have to be determined. Taking into account (1), (2),
(3) and the distribution of the shock, the agent's expected utility is
and therefore his maximization problem can be written as max e e + (1=2)ke 2 (1=2)r 2 2 :
The …rst order condition of this problem is = ek:
Substituting this latter condition into (5) , and then setting the expression (representing the agent's certainty equivalent) equal to gives 4 = (1=2)ke 2 + (1=2)r 2 2 + :
Hence, the principal's maximization problem becomes
which gives the following well-known second best solution for the agent's action 5
Using the fact that = ek, it follows that the optimal share of output paid to the agent is
and the optimal …xed payment is
Let now 2 denote the variance of the optimal project. This is the solution of the following maximization problem of the principal
subject to the technological constraint (4). 6 The …rst order condition of this problem is
and, therefore, the variance 2 of the optimal project is implicitly de…ned by the following equation
where k k( 2 ) and k 0 k 0 ( 2 ). 7 The e¤ort cost parameter for the optimal technology follows from (4) and it is k( 2 ).
As the existence of a unique global maximum 2 will be useful for the comparative static analysis, we restrict the attention to the set of functions k( 2 ) representing the technological relation between e¢ ciency and riskiness that ensures this outcome. A unique maximum requires that the pro…t function in (10) is increasing for 2 < 2 and decreasing for 2 > 2 ,
Note that the sign of d =d 2 is the same as the sign of the function F ( 2 ) in (12) . Hence, from F ( 2 ) = 0 it follows that F ( 2 ) monotonically decreasing in 2 guarantees that F ( 2 ) > 0 when 2 < 2 and F ( 2 ) < 0 when 2 > 2 ; this in turn 5 The …rst order condition of problem (6) is d =de = 1 ke rk 2 e 2 = 0 and the second order condition is always satis…ed as d 2 =de 2 = k rk 2 2 < 0. 6 It is immediate that the maximized expected pro…t (for a given technology) is obtained from the substitution of (7) into (6) . 7 Note that the …rst two components of (12) are positive while the third one is negative.
implies that d =d 2 R 0 if 2 Q 2 with 2 as the unique maximum. In other words, a unique maximum requires that
The …rst component of (13) is positive (as k 0 < 0), the second is negative while the third one has the opposite sign of k 00 . Therefore, while k( 2 ) can generally be concave or convex, a su¢ cient condition for (13) to hold is that k( 2 ) is su¢ ciently convex, i.e. that k 00 is positive and large enough.
The existence of an interior solution 2 2 (0; 2 ) to the equation F ( 2 ) = 0 in (12) is
As the second component of (12) is nonnegative, a su¢ cient condi-
so that the sum of the …rst and third component of F ( 2 ) is strictly positive. 8 From lim 2 ! 2 k 0 = 0 and k k( 2 ) > 0 follows that the …rst two components of (12) tend to zero as 2 reaches the upper bound 2 ; hence,
The following proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition 1
The principal chooses the technology with the variance 2 implicitly de…ned by equation (12) and with the level of e¢ ciency k( 2 ) de…ned in (4) . The agent optimally chooses the action e reported in (7) and the coe¢ cients of the linear payment scheme and are de…ned by (8) and (9) with k k( 2 ) and 2 2 respectively.
Agent' s Risk aversion and the Provision of Incentives
In this section, we analyze how a variation in the agent's risk aversion a¤ects the provision of incentives when, as in our framework, such a variation also induces a change in the technology adopted. We then provide the conditions for a positive relationship between agent's risk aversion and incentives and …nally illustrate our analysis in the case where the technology function k( 2 ) has a speci…c functional form.
The E¤ects of a Change of the Agent' s Risk Aversion on Incentives
We …rst note that a reduction in the agent's risk aversion increases the riskiness 2 as well as the e¢ ciency (k( 2 ) goes down) of the technology chosen by the principal. Indeed, by applying the implicit function theorem to equation (12), we obtain that
as the denominator is negative from the second order condition of maximization problem (10) and the numerator is also negative since the …rst order condition (12) implies that 2rkk 0 2
Now we show that while the reduction of the agent's risk aversion induces the principal to provide more incentives by increasing the agent's payment related to the output for any
given technology adopted (it is immediate from (8) that is decreasing in r), this result may no longer hold if the lower risk aversion of the agent leads the principal to change the technology employed (i.e., its e¢ ciency and riskiness). In this case the characteristics of the new technology may a¤ects the optimal provision of incentives in ways that counterbalance the former (standard) e¤ect.
The total e¤ect of a reduction of the agent's risk aversion on the optimal share of output paid to the agent is obtained by total di¤erentiation of (8), which gives
Let us now analyze each of these e¤ects generated by a decrease in agent's risk aversion on in detail. The …rst component in (15) represents the (standard) direct e¤ ect of a reduction of r on , namely the e¤ect on if the same technology is employed. This component is
and it is always negative as a lower agent's risk aversion makes it optimal for the principal to give more incentives and less insurance to the agent, which requires increasing the payment related to output (i.e., ).
The other two components in (15) represent the indirect e¤ ect of the reduction of r on , i.e. the e¤ect caused by a change in the technology employed (following by the reduction of the agent's risk aversion) on the incentives provided by the principal to the agent. From (14) we know that the new technology is characterized by a higher riskiness and a higher e¢ ciency which generate two opposing e¤ects on .
The higher riskiness 2 of the new project adopted when the agent's risk aversion decreases makes it optimal the provision of more insurance and less incentives to the agent as
In other words, a reduction of r increases the riskiness of the optimal technology (@ 2 =@r < 0, see (14) ) and this increases the payment related to output (see (17)). We call this the riskiness e¤ ect and it has the opposite sign of the (standard) direct e¤ect generated by the reduction of the agent's risk aversion r.
However, the new technology is also characterized by a higher e¢ ciency (i.e., a lower cost of e¤ort k), which makes it optimal an increase of incentives as
Speci…cally, a reduction of r leads to the adoption of a project which has a lower k (together with a higher 2 ), and this increases the payment related to output. We call this the e¢ ciency e¤ ect and it has the same sign of the direct e¤ect caused by a lower r. 9 Hence, the net indirect e¤ect due to the adoption of a riskier and more e¢ cient technology may in general lead to an increase or a decrease of incentives. In particular, the following three situations may arise.
(i) When the e¢ ciency e¤ect dominates the riskiness e¤ect, the net indirect e¤ect has the same sign of the (standard) direct e¤ect. Therefore, a lower agent's risk aversion increases the incentives that the principal provides to the agent; in other words, increases as r lowers because the additional indirect e¤ect generated by the change of the technology employed on the payment scheme reinforces the standard e¤ect.
(ii) When instead the riskiness e¤ect prevails over the e¢ ciency e¤ect, the net indirect e¤ect due to the change of the technology adopted (generated by a less risk averse agent) implies that the principal may …nd it optimal to reduce the incentives provided to the agent. As in this case the indirect e¤ect has the opposite sign of the (standard) direct e¤ect, the …nal e¤ect on the compensation scheme depends on which of these two e¤ects prevails. If the indirect e¤ect is not strong enough to more than compensate the (standard) direct e¤ect, then the …nal e¤ect is the same of that one described at the previous point (i). 9 A straightforward comparison shows that, di¤erently from our model, the endogenous matching models only consider the direct and the indirect riskiness e¤ ect (e.g. Serfes [10] ), but not the indirect e¢ ciency e¤ect. Thus, whereas under positive assortative matching the riskiness e¤ect is negative (since riskier principals attract more risk-averse agents) under negative assortative matching the indirect riskiness e¤ect is positive (since now riskier principals are matched with less risk-averse agents) and the …nal e¤ect of risk on incentives may, in this case, be ambiguous.
(iii) If the indirect e¤ect more than compensate the (standard) direct e¤ect, then the principal will …nd it optimal to decrease the incentives provided to the agent by reducing the share of the agent's payment related to the output as r goes down.
This latter case is the most interesting for our theory as it represents the situation where the change of technology adopted induces a variation in the sign of the relationship (relative to the standard theory) between the agent's risk aversion and the degree of incentives provided by the principal to the agent. As a condition for observing a positive (rather than a negative) relationship between risk aversion and incentives is the dominance of the riskiness e¤ect on the e¢ ciency e¤ect, so that the indirect e¤ect has the opposite sign of the standard direct e¤ect, we now try to understand under what conditions this situation is more likely.
Agent' s Risk Aversion and Incentives: the Conditions for a Positive Link
Let us …rst analyze the case where the net indirect e¤ect has the same sign of the direct e¤ect, so that d =dr in (15) is always negative and, therefore, a lower agent's risk aversion leads to more incentives (this is the case described above at point (i)).
From the last two components in the right-hand side of (15), we know that the indirect e¤ect is negative if @ 2 @r @ @ 2 + @ @k @k @ 2 0:
As from (14), @ 2 =@r is always negative, it is immediate to see that the above inequality requires that @ @ 2 + @ @k k 0 0;
where k 0 @k=@ 2 . Using the expressions in (17) and (18), we obtain that the inequality in (19) is satis…ed when the following condition holds.
Condition 1
The elasticity E k of the technology function k( 2 ) with respect to the variance is weakly greater than 1, i.e.,
In order to better understand the intuition behind the result leading to Condition 1, let us again recall that a necessary condition for observing a positive (rather than a negative) relationship between risk aversion and incentives is the dominance of the riskiness e¤ect on the e¢ ciency e¤ect, so that the indirect e¤ect goes in the opposite direction of the (standard) direct e¤ect and may eventually prevail over the latter. Otherwise, the usual relationship between risk aversion and incentives described in case (i) holds.
The reduction of the agent's risk aversion induces the principal to adopt a more e¢ cient and riskier technology. The higher riskiness of the technology makes it optimal for the principal to reduce the incentives (and increase the insurance) to the agent by making the payment more related to output (this riskiness e¤ect leads to a reduction of ). The fact that the technology is more e¢ cient induces instead the principal to increase the incentives to the agent by making his payment more related to output (this e¢ ciency e¤ect increases ). Now, if the function k( 2 ) is elastic, then for any given increase in the riskiness 2 of the new technology employed (and therefore for any given size of the riskiness e¤ect) the increase in the e¢ ciency of the selected technology (going in the standard direction) will be large. In turn, this will make more likely that the e¢ ciency e¤ect dominates the riskiness e¤ect. Condition 1 simply states that the required threshold on elasticity E k for this phenomenon to take place is 1. When, conversely, the function k( 2 ) is rigid (namely for E k < 1) and Condition 1 does not hold, an increase in the riskiness of the adopted technology implies that the e¢ ciency e¤ect may dominate the riskiness e¤ect.
In other words, the elasticity of the technology function E k positively a¤ects the size of the e¢ ciency e¤ect relative to the riskiness e¤ect. Given that the latter e¤ect needs to prevail over the former to reverse the standard relationship between agent's risk aversion and incentives, the elasticity E k needs to be relatively small (i.e., Condition 1 does not have to hold) for this to happen.
It is also important to emphasize that E k < 1 does not guarantee a positive relationship between the agent's degree of risk aversion and incentives as the (standard) direct e¤ect could more than compensate the (net) indirect e¤ect, i.e. the situation described at point (ii) above could apply. However, when this does not happen and the riskiness e¤ect is stronger than the sum of the direct e¤ect and the e¢ ciency e¤ect (i.e., case (iii) applies), thus a higher agent's risk aversion may lead to a reduction of the incentive provided by the principal (i.e. to a reduction of ). This is the case when d =dr in (15) is positive. By substituting (14), (16) , (17), and (18) in (15) and rearranging terms, we obtain that d =dr > 0 occurs when the elasticity E k of the technology function is lower than a given thresholdÊ k , i.e. if the following condition holds. 10
Condition 2
The elasticity E k of the technology function k( 2 ) with respect to the variance is smaller than a thresholdÊ k < 1, i.e.
Proposition 2 A reduction in the agent's risk aversion r generates two e¤ ects on the optimal share of output paid to the agent. The direct e¤ ect always increases while the indirect e¤ ect due to the higher riskiness and e¢ ciency of the new technology adopted can lead to an increase or a decrease of . The following results may be obtained.
(i) When Condition 1 is satis…ed, both the direct and indirect e¤ ects have the same sign and a lower agent's risk aversion r unambiguously increase (i.e., @ =@r < 0) as in the standard principal-agent model.
(ii) When Condition 1 does not hold, the total e¤ ect of r on can either be negative or positive, depending on the magnitude of the direct and of the indirect e¤ ects.
(iii) When Condition 2 holds, the indirect e¤ ect have the opposite sign of the direct e¤ ect and larger size; therefore, a lower agent's risk aversion r unambiguously decreases (i.e., d =dr > 0), which is an opposite result to the one usually obtained in the standard principalagent model.
To further clarify this point in more detail, we consider below a speci…c functional form for the relationship between the cost parameter k of the agent and the risk of the project expressed by 2 .
An Example
We assume that the function representing the technological set k( 2 ) has a speci…c functional form characterized by constant elasticity, i.e. k = ( 2 ) , with 2 2 (0; 1) and 2 (0; 1=2). 11
This means that k is …nite and positive for all 2 , k 0 = k( 2 ) 1 < 0, and k 00 = ( + 1)k( 2 ) 2 > 0.
The …rst order condition (12) of the principal's maximization problem can be rewritten as
which implies that the variance of the optimal technology is equal to 2 = r (1 2 ) 1 1 :
(21) 1 1 As it will be clear below, < 1=2 is necessary to obtain an interior solution.
As we showed for the general case, the function F ( 2 ) has the same sign of d =d 2 . From (20), we obtain that
which is negative for all 2 < [r (1 2 )] 1 1 2 . The parameter < 1=2 implies that 2 < 2 and, therefore, that the function F ( 2 ) is decreasing at 2 = 2 . As there is no other point at which F ( 2 ) = 0 (from (21) it is immediate that 2 is unique), it follows that F ( 2 ) > 0 for all 2 < 2 and F ( 2 ) < 0 for all 2 > 2 . This in turn implies that d =d 2 R 0 if 2 Q 2 and therefore that 2 is the unique maximum.
From < 1=2 follows that Condition 1 does not hold (as E k = < 1) and the indirect e¤ect is positive, i.e., the change of technology induced by the lower agent's risk aversion r leads to a reduction of (the riskiness e¤ect dominates the e¢ ciency e¤ect). This indirect e¤ect opposes to the direct e¤ect which instead pushes for an increase in . The total e¤ect of a reduction of r on can be computed by substituting (16) , (17), (18) and @ 2 =@r (which is obtained from (21)) into (15) . This leads to @ =@r = 0 which means that, in this special case, the direct and indirect e¤ect of a change in r on exactly o¤set each other and therefore that a reduction in the agent's risk aversion leaves the fraction of output paid to the agent unchanged.
From (20) we also obtain that @ 2 @ 2 @r = 2 1 + (2 1) ;
which can be either positive or negative for < 1=2 (e.g., if 2 = 1, the expression is positive for > 1=3 and negative for < 1=3) and, therefore, is in general compatible with both positive and negative assortative matchings, as discussed in Footnote 9.
Extensions and Discussion
In this section, we address two issues. We …rst describe the role played by asymmetric information in explaining the choice of the principal and then we show that our results are robust to changes of the baseline setting by analyzing a framework where the higher return of riskier projects does not imply a reduction of the marginal cost of e¤ort.
It is worth emphasizing that in absence of asymmetric information between the principal and the agent, each project has a net return for the principal = y c(e) = e (1=2)ke 2 +" because the agent's payment is equal to his certainty equivalent plus the cost of e¤ort, i.e. it is equal to + (1=2)ke 2 ; the principal optimally fully insures the agent when there is no moral hazard. As more e¢ cient technologies have a lower marginal cost of e¤ort k, this implies a higher expected value of the net return of the project as this is given by E( ) = e (1=2)ke 2 .
At the same time, more e¢ cient technologies are also riskier as projects with a lower marginal cost of e¤ort k are associated to a higher variance 2 of the shock; this implies a higher variance of the project's net return as this is equal to the variance of the shock, i.e. V ar( ) = V ar(") = 2 . However, in this case, our problem has a trivial solution: the risk neutral principal adopts the most e¢ cient technology, i.e. the one with the lowest marginal cost of e¤ort k k( 2 ) and the highest variance 2 . Indeed, one can easily verify that the optimal agent's e¤ort is e = 1=k
and therefore the optimal net return is equal to = 1=(2k) + "; as the principal is risk neutral, she …nds it optimal choosing the most e¢ cient technology with k k( 2 ). This result comes from the fact that, in absence of asymmetric information, the agent's risk premium is equal to zero (because the principal optimally bears all risk and provides full insurance to the agent) and therefore the technology with the highest expected return is the most e¢ cient one.
When there is asymmetric information between the principal and the agent, the net return of the project is represented by the expected net pro…t of the (risk-neutral) principal reported in (10) . From the maximization problem (10), we know that is increasing for 2 < 2 and decreasing for 2 > 2 . In this setting, the agent's risk premium becomes positive because the provision of incentives requires that the principal does not fully insure the agents who has to bear some risk. Such a risk premium is a¤ected not only by the agent's degree of risk aversion but also by the technology employed and by the optimal incentive scheme, which in turn depends on the characteristics (in terms of e¢ ciency and riskiness) of the technology. It is the variation of this risk premium with the project implemented that contributes to break the monotonic positive relationship between and 2 that characterizes the setting without asymmetric information and that leads to an interior solution for the optimal project (even if the principal, who chooses the technology, is risk neutral).
We now compare our model results with those obtained in a similar setting where the projects among which the principal can choose yield a return y = e + ", with the shock " N ( ( 2 ); 2 ), and with 0 @ ( 2 )=@ 2 > 0, namely higher error means are associated with higher variances. For simplicity, k is now given and independent on 2 so that the agent's cost is not linked to the variance of the technology employed, i.e. c(e) is still given by (3). 12 It is easy to verify that, similarly to the baseline model, the optimal share of output paid to the agent is still given by the expression in (8) and that the net principal's pro…t is the same as the one reported in (10) with the addition of the mean ( 2 ) of the shock and the fact that k is …xed rather than being a function of 2 , i.e. the principal's maximization problem now reads
:
Thus, the optimal project is the one with the variance 2 that satis…es the following …rst order condition @ @ 2 = 0 r 2 (1 + rk 2 ) 2 = 0:
Since 0 > 0, (23) will normally lead to a unique maximum for the choice of the project. The solution of condition (23) will be interior when the second order condition of the maximization problem is satis…ed, i.e. when @ 2 @( 2 ) 2 = 00 +
which generally holds when 00 @ 2 ( 2 )=@( 2 ) 2 is negative and large enough.
From the …rst order condition (23), one can easily derive the following relationship between the equilibrium project variance and the degree of agent's risk aversion:
The second order condition in (24) implies that the denominator of (25) is negative and, therefore, the sign of @ 2 =@r is the same as the sign of the term rk 2 1. This means that @ 2 =@r < 0 if rk 2 < 1, i.e. a reduction of the agent's risk aversion leads the principal to select a riskier project when the levels of risk aversion, project variance and marginal cost of e¤ort are relatively low.
Since now k is unrelated to the project's variance (@k=@ 2 = 0), from the expression in (15) we observe that the indirect e¢ ciency e¤ ect (represented by the third component) is absent.
This implies that, in this new framework, if rk 2 < 1 so that @ 2 =@r < 0, the indirect e¤ ect of r on coincides with the indirect riskiness e¤ ect (which is the key new e¤ect at work in the baseline framework). 13 The absence of the indirect e¢ ciency e¤ect in this setting only works in the direction of making our conclusions more robust as such e¤ect only reinforces the standard direct e¤ect. 1 3 Note that and @ =@ 2 < 0 are still given by (8) and (17) respectively. compensate the (standard) direct e¤ect (given by the …rst term in (15)), the principal optimally chooses a riskier project and decreases the incentives provided to the agent by reducing the share of the agent's payment related to the output when the agent's risk aversion r declines (as described in point (iii) at the end of Section 4).
In other words, the analysis just presented shows that the indirect riskiness e¤ect highlighted in the baseline framework (and that is at the heart of the contribution of this work) is present and could dominate even more frequently in a setting where the project's riskiness is related to the error mean of the technology employed rather than to the marginal cost of e¤ort.
Conclusions
We have shown that in a principal-agent model with endogenous technology choice the usual negative trade-o¤ existing between the agent's risk aversion and optimal incentives does not necessarily hold and can, in some cases, be reversed. We have shown this result by using a modi…ed version of the Holmstrom and Milgrom's [1] framework where the principal can choose among di¤erent technologies where those with higher e¢ ciency also have higher riskiness.
Our analysis highlights how, in such a framework, the reduction of the agent's risk aversion induces the adoption of a riskier technology that, in some cases, can revert the usual e¤ects and lead to a reduction of the level of incentives provided to the agent. We have shown that such a result is more likely to occur when the link between the e¢ ciency of the technology and its riskiness is relatively weak. Moreover, we have presented a special case where the increase in the riskiness of the technology is such that its e¤ect on incentives counterbalances all the other e¤ects leading to a neutrality between agent's risk aversion and the degree of incentives provided.
While this work has highlighted a new channel a¤ecting the incentive scheme in principalagent relationships, we think that additional work is needed to properly disentangle the relationship between the choice of technology (e.g., its degree of innovation and riskiness) and the amount of incentives provided by the …rm. However, we leave this task to future research.
